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Abstract
The essence of policy conflicts remains largely underdeveloped, both theoretically and empiri-
cally. We explore policy conflict and explain its cognitive and behavioral characteristics using 
data from a survey administered to policy actors involved in oil and gas politics in Colorado, 
USA. The analysis begins with a description of the cognitive and behavioral characteristics 
of policy actors and then combines them into a single index to depict varying intensities of 
conflict. Cognitive characteristics are comprised of three dimensions: disagreement on pub-
lic policy, perceived threats from opponents, and an unwillingness to compromise. Behavioral 
characteristics include engagement by policy actors in a range of activities, from mobilizing 
opponents to providing information to the media. Ordered Logit models are used to associate 
the attributes of policy actors with cognitive and behavioral characteristics and an index of 
conflict intensity that combines these two characteristics. The conclusion offers questions and 
recommendations for future research.
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Introduction
Conflicts over policy decisions – or what government should or should not do – pervade phe-
nomena relating to politics and government. Policy conflicts bring to light competing inter-
ests and values in society and, in doing so, can be both productive and destructive to political 
systems. Moderate levels of conflict, for instance, may lead to innovative policy decisions and 
learning. More intense levels of conflict, however, may reflect an inability of policy actors to 
compromise, an entrenchment of beliefs, or a demonization of opponents. Despite the impor-
tance of policy conflict to society and to policy processes, policy scholars often neglect to de-
scribe and explain the underlying characteristics of policy conflicts. To help address this limita-
tion, we offer theoretical and empirical insights into policy conflicts by examining the cognitive 
and behavioral characteristics of the policy actors involved. 
The Policy Conflict Framework (PCF) helps guide our analysis (Heikkila & Weible, 2017; Weible 
& Heikkila, 2017). Under the PCF, a policy conflict occurs when two or more policy actors ex-
hibit varying levels of certain cognitive and/or behavioral characteristics around a proposed or 
existing policy decision or action. The cognitive characteristics of policy conflict consist of disa-
greement on policy proposals between policy actors, perceived threats that policy actors feel 
from their opponents’ policy proposals, and an unwillingness to compromise by one or more 
policy actor. The behavioral characteristics of policy conflict include the actions that policy ac-
tors deploy to influence the policy decision. To date, the empirical research has yet to explore 
the cognitive and behavioral dimensions of a policy conflict in tandem, an exploration which 
would aid understanding of the intensity of policy conflict and, eventually, comparisons of 
policy conflict. 
We apply PCF as a lens to study policy conflict surrounding oil and gas development in the 
state of Colorado, which, like many regions of the United States, has witnessed significant 
growth in oil and gas drilling over the last decade. Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling 
technologies have spurred the expansion of oil and gas development in Colorado. Many prop-
erties, towns, and cities have been exposed to the industry in ways never experienced before. 
Additionally, as we have seen at both the national level, and across other states, disagreements 
about the risks and benefits of oil and gas development are prevalent in Colorado (Weible & 
Heikkila, 2016; Heikkila, Weible, & Olofsson, 2017). As Colorado is representative of the types 
of issues surrounding debates over unconventional oil and gas development, it offers a useful 
case for probing new theoretical insights around policy conflict. 
This article explores the cognitive and behavioral characteristics of policy conflict, how they re-
late to each other, and what factors shape them among a population of policy actors involved in 
oil and gas politics in Colorado. Before presenting the methods and results, we offer a synopsis 
of the PCF and the oil and gas case study in Colorado. This article concludes with an examina-
tion of the theoretical and empirical insights that this research offers the literature and some 
lessons for how we conceive of, and assess, policy conflicts. 
A Synopsis of the Policy Conflict Framework
One assumption of the research conducted in this article is that the deliberate use of an ana-
lytical lens, in the form of a framework, helps to clarify concepts and their interdependencies 
in the study of a phenomenon. The lens used to help in guiding this case is the PCF, which was 
created to bring theoretical and empirical attention to one of the most important concepts in 
the study of policy and politics: conflict (Weible & Heikkila, 2017). The PCF operates as a bri-
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colage of different theoretical and methodological insights from various literatures which are 
related to, and which can inform, policy conflicts. These include Schattschneider (1957; 1960), 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2017), the Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework (Ostrom, 2009), the conflict-resolution and alternative dispute lit-
eratures (Susskind et al., 1999), and political psychology (Kahan, 2012; Kahneman & Tversky, 
2013). Building on these forms of knowledge, the PCF represents a reservoir of insights that 
can guide research in studying the sources, characteristics, and effects of policy conflicts, the 
evolution and change of policy conflicts over time, and the comparisons of policy conflicts 
across settings. 
What is policy conflict? The answer depends on the scale of the research (individual, policy-
action situation, policy subsystem, political system), the intent of the researcher and the re-
searcher’s questions. For this study, we explore policy conflict within a policy subsystem (oil 
and gas development) and tie the meaning of policy conflict to a population of policy actors 
who are individuals in and outside of governments engaged in the subsystem. The manifesta-
tion of conflict within this subsystem can be observed through the cognitive and behavioral 
characteristics of conflict within and among policy actors. This means that we depict policy 
conflict based on the ways in which people perceive conflict and exhibit conflict behaviors in 
relation to the issue in a policy subsystem. We make no judgments in this article, and neither 
does the PCF, about whether characteristics of policy conflict in this study are good or bad for 
policy outcomes or for democratic institutions. In this regard, our objectives are normatively 
agnostic and focused on descriptive and explanatory objectives. 
The PCF operationalizes individual-level cognitive and behavioral characteristics of policy con-
flict through their underlying dimensions. The first dimension that underlies cognitive char-
acteristics is the divergence between policy actors’ policy proposals or positions. This first di-
mension reflects a number of similar depictions of conflict and contention as deriving from 
differences in public policy positions (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). The 
second cognitive dimension involves threats from opponents’ policy positions. Divergence in 
positions alone is not always conflictual; conflicts emerge when the position of one policy actor 
is perceived as a threat to another (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007; Cobb & Elder, 1972; Jenkins-Smith 
et al., 2014). The third cognitive dimension is an unwillingness to compromise by policy actors 
on policy positions, which sustains conflict. The minimum conditions for policy conflict to be 
present among a group of policy actors require at least two or more individuals to exhibit these 
three characteristics. However, we also recognize that there may be varying levels or degrees of 
these characteristics present within a group of policy actors. For instance, there may be more 
or less intensity, both in the number of actors and in the perceptions of actors who express 
divergence in positions, perceived threats, or unwillingness to compromise. 
The behavioral characteristics of conflict involve a range of strategies or tactics used by policy 
actors to influence different aspects of government policies. Hundreds of such behaviors might 
exist, but for simplification, one way to categorize them includes considering “inside” govern-
ment activities, or those that attempt to influence government officials directly. This might 
involve communicating with government officials by providing information through various 
means (e.g. letters, lobbying, reports), or sharing opinions with government officials in differ-
ent types of government decision-making processes (Schattschneider, 1960; Baumgartner & 
Jones, 1993; Pralle, 2006). Other behaviors include “outside” government activities, such as 
mobilizing the general public, building and maintaining advocacy coalitions, or running media 
campaigns. Although one might assume that behavioral characteristics might be adversarial 
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(e.g. coordinating only with allies), they can also be collaborative (e.g., cooperating with op-
ponents, or brokering agreements among parties during policy conflict) (Jenkins-Smith, 1990; 
Weible, 2008). As with cognitive characteristics, at least two or more policy actors would ex-
hibit behavioral characteristics of conflict when policy conflict exists, and the degree to which 
different policy actors engage in these behaviors will vary within political systems, policy sub-
systems, or policy action situations.
The cognitive and behavioral characteristics of conflict can be unpacked for analysis of their 
underlying dimensions, or they can be combined into an index for the analysis of policy conflict 
between policy actors at different levels of analysis (Heikkila & Weible, 2017). In this article, 
we use two sets of survey questions to create indices of the cognitive and behavioral charac-
teristics of policy conflict: one that combines the three cognitive dimensions and another that 
combines multiple behavioral dimensions. We then combine these two indices into a cognitive 
and behavioral composite index. As explained later in this article, we use an ordered logit mod-
el to specify the various likelihoods of policy actors falling along the spectrum of cognitive and 
behavioral (or combined) characteristics, based on their intrapersonal (e.g., what they perceive 
or know) or their interpersonal (e.g., how they relate to others) attributes. 
Hypotheses
Under the logic of the PCF, theoretical relationships among key factors in policy conflicts are 
expressed through a set of “primary dynamics” which embody the general theoretical expecta-
tions of the PCF (Weible & Heikkila, 2017). The logic of the primary dynamics offers a founda-
tion for deriving contextually specific hypotheses for one or more case studies. We expect some 
hypotheses to be confirmed and others to be refuted, depending on the types of measures and 
the particularities of the case. Over time, and through the testing of hypotheses across multi-
ple cases, the primary dynamics of policy conflicts will be updated and revised. 
The two defining characteristics of policy conflicts under the PCF are expected to be interactive 
and related. However, the direction of their relationship is difficult to ascertain a priori. One 
might assume that cognitive characteristics of policy conflict should precede the behavioral 
characteristics of policy conflict. The temporal assumption here is that people think before 
they act and that no action precedes those thoughts. In policy conflicts, such as oil and gas 
politics in Colorado, policy actors are likely to have experienced conflict cognitively and behav-
iorally. Memories and experiences of past actions may heighten or dampen current perceptions 
of conflict. The relationships between cognition and behavior are therefore likely to be dynamic 
and difficult to tease apart in any research study, particularly cross-sectional surveys as used 
herein. Thus, in this study, we do not posit a one-directional relationship to and from the two 
characteristics of policy conflict. Instead, we expect the cognitive characteristics and behavioral 
characteristics of policy conflict to be associated. While this hypothesis might be indisputable, 
it has yet to be formally written and tested and the nature of the posited association is very 
much unknown; that is, it could be linear or nonlinear. We therefore treat this first hypothesis 
as a relationship possibly to confirm, but more as a means to focus attention on, the nature of 
the association, assuming that there is one. It is possible that this relationship is not a given. 
For instance, some individuals might express cognitive characteristics of conflict, but do not 
engage in conflictual behaviors. It may also be possible that policy actors exhibit conflictual be-
haviors, for instance as part of their professional duties, but they may not manifest high levels 
of the cognitive characteristics of conflict. 
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In addition to identifying the underlying characteristics of policy conflict, the PCF posits that 
the intrapersonal and interpersonal attributes of policy actors shape policy conflicts, recog-
nizing that how these attributes play out within particular policy conflicts is likely to vary. 
These attributes may also vary depending on whether we focus on the cognitive or behavioral 
characteristics of conflict, or on the combination of these characteristics. In previous research 
we have examined how these attributes relate to cognitive characteristics (Heikkila & Weible, 
2017), but we have not explored whether these relationships hold when considering behavioral 
characteristics and the combination of cognitive and behavioral characteristics.
The intrapersonal attributes examined include deep core beliefs, policy-relevant knowledge, 
and perceptions of risks and benefits. We operationalize deep core beliefs based on the Ad-
vocacy Coalition Framework (Jenkins-Smith et al,. 2014). Deep core beliefs are fundamental 
normative or ontological orientations. We operationalize deep core beliefs via a traditional 
right-left measure of political ideology. Previous research found that more liberal political ide-
ology was associated with greater odds of scoring higher on the cognitive index of policy con-
flict in the case of oil and gas development (Heikkila & Weible, 2017). This relationship could 
play out similarly with behavioral characteristics, but we do not have a priori theory to develop 
this expectation. Therefore, we simply expect that political ideology will be associated with policy 
conflict characteristics. 
The second intrapersonal attribute is policy-relevant knowledge that captures policy actors’ 
experience and expertise in relation to the policy issue. Policy-relevant knowledge is impor-
tant in policy conflict, in part because it can be associated with cognitive biases and sources of 
disagreement (Jenkins-Smith, 1990; Weible, 2008). It can also provide the capacity that policy 
actors need to engage in policy conflict behaviors and, thus, represents a form of power. The 
measure used in this study for policy-relevant knowledge includes diversity of experience with 
oil and gas issues and formal education. Prior research found that education played a minor 
role in shaping cognitive characteristics of conflict (namely, higher levels of education were sig-
nificantly associated with lower odds of divergent policy positions, but not with the composite 
cognitive conflict index). We expect that, when behavioral characteristics are accounted for, policy 
relevant knowledge will be associated with policy conflict characteristics. 
As the third intrapersonal policy actor attribute, perceptions of risks and benefits relate to 
the relative tradeoffs involving perceived losses and harms from an issue versus the perceived 
gains. Perceptions under the PCF are identified, filtered, and processed through their beliefs, 
emotions, and identities. This article provides two measures of risks and benefits: 1) the per-
ceived relative balance of risks and benefits; and 2) the perceived rigidity of risk and benefit 
perceptions. Past research on the cognitive characteristics of policy conflict found that the 
rigidity of risk-benefit perceptions was consistently associated with cognitive characteristics, 
but perceiving more risks relative to benefits was not (Heikkila & Weible, 2017). When ac-
counting for behavioral characteristics, we do not know if this pattern will hold. Rigidity may 
be more important in shaping cognitive outcomes, while higher risk perceptions may lead poli-
cy actors to engage in more behaviors, or both. Therefore, we hypothesize that policy actors who 
perceive more risks relative to benefits, and the more rigidity there is in risk-benefit perceptions, the 
more policy actors are likely to exhibit intense policy conflict characteristics.
This article uses two concepts and measures of interpersonal attributes to help understand 
policy conflicts. For the first, we assess the extent that policy actors are isolated in their net-
works. As past research on cognitive characteristics has shown, the more isolated policy actors 
are, the more constrained are their sources of information, the more closed are their perspec-
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tives and the more they are likely to exhibit intense cognitive conflict characteristics (Heikkila 
& Weible, 2017). Recognizing that insulated networks may affect behaviors in a different way 
than cognitive characteristics, in general, we hypothesize that policy actors with more insulated 
policy actor networks are more likely to exhibit intense policy conflict characteristics.
For the second interpersonal attribute, this article includes measures of organizational af-
filiation. Drawing on lessons from the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Jenkins-Smith, et al., 
1991), we expect non-government organizations to experience conflict in a different way than 
government organizations, especially in their roles as advocates. This was the case with find-
ings of cognitive characteristics of conflict in the oil and gas subsystem (Heikkila & Weible 
2017); we would logically assume this finding to hold when accounting for behaviors. Thus, 
we hypothesize that individuals affiliated with organizations that have taken advocacy positions 
(e.g. environmental groups or industry associations) are more likely to exhibit intense policy conflict 
characteristics than are non-advocacy oriented organizational affiliations (e.g. government and aca-
demia). 
Study Context
The level of action for this application of the PCF is the policy subsystem relating to oil and 
gas development using hydraulic fracturing in Colorado. Between 2007 and 2013, crude oil 
production in Colorado rose by 146% and natural gas production rose by 38%, making Colo-
rado one of the largest producers of energy from oil and natural gas in the United States (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration 2014a). Most of the gas and oil development since 2007 
has occurred in the Denver-Julesberg Basin in north-east Colorado (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2014b), which is close to Colorado’s major metropolitan areas. At the time 
that the data were collected for this study, shale oil and gas production were at peak levels in 
Colorado (Hood 2016). 
In response to this growing industrial activity, local advocacy groups have formed to protest 
industry proposals to drill new oil and gas wells within their communities. Some local com-
munities have tried to ban or impose moratoria on hydraulic fracturing as well. The state has 
adopted several regulatory changes in response to concerns over oil and gas development, such 
as mandatory requirements for disclosure of hydraulic fracturing chemicals, increased setback 
distances between wells and occupied buildings, floodplain mapping requirements, and rules 
for controlling methane and other air pollutants in the production process. Additionally, a 
Governor’s Task Force was formed in 2014 as a way to mitigate disputes between pro- and 
anti- oil and gas groups. The Task Force produced state-level policy recommendations in 2015 
regarding the allocation of authority in governing hydraulic fracturing between local and state 
levels. Disputes over jurisdictional issues have also been expressed in state courts. For exam-
ple, the oil and gas industry sued local governments that tried to ban fracking in 2014 and, in 
2016, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that local-level hydraulic fracturing bans violated the 
pre-emption clause of the state constitution. 
Data and Methods
In studying the subsystem-level conflict around oil and gas development in Colorado, we first 
conducted nine interviews with policy actors from diverse backgrounds, so as to provide infor-
mation on the research context. We then administered an email survey through Qualtrics, an 
online survey platform. The survey population included 453 individuals actively involved or 
knowledgeable about oil and gas development in Colorado. These individuals were identified 
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using a purposive sampling approach based on evidence in media reports, online reports, pub-
lic hearings and testimony, and on recommendations from interviewees.1 A total of 213 people 
responded to the survey, yielding a 47% response rate.2 Not all respondents chose to answer 
every question, so the response rates vary by question. Consistent with PCF, the survey ques-
tions were designed to capture dimensions of the characteristics of policy conflicts, attributes 
of the policy setting, and effects of conflicts.3 
This article creates three indices to operationalize the concept of policy conflict. Table 1 shows 
the measures and calculations for the two indices for the cognitive and behavioral character-
istics of policy conflict and the composite index that combines them. All three indices rely on 
the 2015 survey data.
Table 1. Operationalization of the Characteristics of Policy Conflict
Cognitive 
Characteristics Operational Measure Calculations
Divergent 
Policy Positions
“What comes closest to your current policy posi-
tion on oil and gas development that uses hydrau-
lic fracturing: stop, limit, continue at the current 
rate, expand moderately, or expand extensively 
(1= stop; 5= expand extensively)”
Subtracted the 
mean score of this 
scale (2.96) from 
each respondent’s 
position score and 







“To what extent do the views and actions of those 
you disagree with on oil and gas development us-
ing hydraulic fracturing (a) threaten you person-
ally or professionally; and (b) threaten Colorado?” 
Both response categories were on a scale of 1-5 
(1= not at all; 5= a great deal).
Added the values of 
these two catego-
ries for a combined 
“threats” score 
for each individ-
ual (ranging from 
2-10)
1 — The initial target list of respondents was 630 individuals. After eliminating bounced emails from the list and indi-
viduals who were not actively involved in the issue, the final population was 453.
2 — The response rates by organizational affiliation are: local government (60 of 127 = 47% response rate); industry 
(51 of 123 = 41%); environmental non-profits (31 of 61 = 51%); state government (21 of 28 = 75%); legal professionals 
(17 of 34 = 50%); organized citizen groups (9 of 18 = 50%); university/consultants (12 of 30 = 40%); industry non-
profits (6 of 12 = 50% ); other non-profits (5 of 9 = 56%); media (1 of 6 = 17%), federal government (0 of 4 = 0%); and 
“other” (0 of 1 = 0%).
3 — Access to the full survey instrument can be found at Heikkila & Weible (2015).
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Unwillingness to 
Compromise
Respondents were asked “limit” and “expand” 
questions: 
“(1) Would you support government decisions 
that would significantly limit hydraulic frac-
turing in Colorado under several hypotheti-
cal conditions?” The battery of conditions in-
cluded six items, such as convincing scientific 
evidence showing it is a significant threat to the 
environment or public health or a catastrophic 
disaster or emergency occurred from oil and 
gas development using hydraulic fracturing. 
“(2) Would you support government decisions 
that would significantly expand hydraulic frac-
turing in Colorado under several conditions?” 
The battery of hypothetical conditions included 
six items, such as scientific evidence showing it 
is completely safe to the environment or public 
health or regulators passed and enforced stricter 
regulations (1= strongly disagree; 5= strongly 
agree).
Averaged values for 
the reversed scales 
were calculated 
for respondents in 
favor of hydrau-
lic fracturing for 
the limit question, 
against hydraulic 
fracturing for the 
expand question, 
and in favor of the 




ranges from 1 to 5 
(5= high unwilling-
ness).





tiplied across the 
three dimensions
Behavorial 
Characteristics Operational Measure Calculations
Behavioral Index “Over the past two years have you engaged in 
the following activities: mobilizing the public, 
providing information to the news media, coun-
tering arguments from opponents, coordinating 
with allies, coordinating with opponents, provid-
ing information to government officials, sharing 
opinions with government officials and brokering 
agreements between parties.”4 Respondents were 
coded as 1 if engaged and 0 if not engaged.
Added the eight 
response items 
into an index to 
measure the level 
of behavioral char-
acteristics for each 
respondent
4 — For this survey question, a component of the question asked respondents how effective these strategies were on a 
scale of 1-3. This article does not incorporate the measure of perceived effectiveness.
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Combined 
Cognitive and 










Note: See Appendix A, Table A1 for the frequencies of respondents engaging in each of these 
activities. Some parts of the question have been paraphrased to fit in this table, see Heikkila 
& Weible (2015) for exact wording.
Source:The Authors
Index 1: The cognitive index incorporates three characteristics: divergent policy positions, per-
ceived threats, and unwillingness to compromise. In combining these three characteristics into 
a single index, we created a common scale of 1-3 for each variable (1= “low,” 2= “medium”, and 
3= “high” levels of the conflict characteristic). Values that were one standard deviation below 
the mean and lower were equal to 1. Values of one standard deviation above the mean and 
higher were equal to 3, and those between one standard deviation below and one standard 
deviation above were equal to 2. We then multiplied the scores for each respondent across the 
characteristics to represent a cognitive conflict index (ranging from 1-27).5 
Index 2: The index for the behavioral characteristics incorporates eight different political ac-
tivities, measured dichotomously with 1 if engaged and 0 if not engaged. These eight activities 
were combined into an additive index to measure the level of behavioral characteristics (rang-
ing from 0 to 8).
Index 3: To create a combined index of the cognitive and behavioral characteristics of conflict, 
we first unweighted the cognitive and behavioral indices to put both on a scale of 0-1. This in-
volved multiplying each individual score for each index by the maximum value of the index (= 
respondent’s cognitive index score/27 and respondent’s behavioral index score/8). Then these 
two scores were multiplied to create a combined cognitive-behavioral index.
Operationalizing Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Attributes
This article incorporates several interpersonal and intrapersonal attributes of policy actors to 
explore the hypothesized relationships between policy actor attributes and conflict character-
istics. The intrapersonal attributes include political ideology, as measured by a survey question 
asking respondents to identify as “extremely liberal,” “liberal,” “moderate,” “conservative”, or 
“extremely conservative” (on a scale of -2= extremely liberal, +2= extremely conservative). In-
5 — These three dimensions form a conflict composite index that combines individual respondents’ scores on the three 
dimensions of the cognitive characteristics of conflict along a concord-conflict spectrum. Unlike typical measures of la-
tent variables, where correlated items in the scale are expected to load on to an abstract concept, we conceptualize the 
concord-conflict spectrum as being comprised of three dimensions that might or might not be correlated. For example, 
perceptions of threats might or more not be correlated with divergent policy positions. 
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trapersonal attributes include respondents’ experience and education. The experience measure 
came from a question about respondents’ level of experience (on a scale of 1 to 4: 1= no expe-
rience, 4= a lot of experience) of eight activities (i.e., researching technical issues, analyzing 
financial issues, planning or working on oil and gas operations, regulating, owning mineral 
rights, living near oil and gas operations, and engaging in political activity to influence govern-
ment concerning oil and gas). The final variable for the analysis was an additive score of each 
of the different types of experiences across the eight areas. Education level was measured on 
a 5-point scale on the survey, from high school degree, some college, bachelor’s degree, and 
master’s degree, to PhD/MD/JD. 
Included under intrapersonal attributes are risk and benefit perceptions. The level of perceived 
risks relative to perceived benefits was measured using a battery of questions that ranked the 
level of respondents’ agreement with various risks and benefits associated with oil and gas 
development (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree). This measure used the average ranking 
of the risks for each respondent and subtracted the average ranking of benefits to achieve the 
measure of perceived “risks relative to benefits”. A second indicator was developed for rigid-
ity in perceptions of risks and benefits. This measure came from a survey question that asked 
respondents whether they had become less concerned, stayed the same, or become more con-
cerned, first about the risks and then about the benefits of oil and gas development (-1= less 
concerned, 0= same, +1= more concerned). These responses were used to calculate rigidity by 
assigning respondents who want fracking stopped or limited the value of the questions on 
risks, and respondents who want fracking expanded the value of their response on the ben-
efits. For respondents who had reported wanting oil and gas development to continue at the 
current rate, we averaged the score of their position on risk and benefit rigidity questions.
Indicators for the interpersonal attributes include network insularity and organizational affili-
ation. To measure network insularity, we asked respondents to rank the importance of their in-
teractions with various types of groups in achieving their personal or professional goals related 
to oil and gas development (on a scale of 1 to 5: 1= not at all important, 5= very important). We 
used the combined degree of importance of interactions with the two industry groups on the 
battery, then subtracted the combined score for the interactions with environmental groups 
and citizen groups, and calculated the absolute value of this measure. A low score is interpreted 
as “balanced” interactions and a high score equates to more insular interactions. To measure 
organizational affiliation, we coded the organization types associated with the contact infor-
mation for the respondent. In this analysis, respondents are associated with three groups: 1) 
private industry or industry association; 2) environmental organizations or citizens’ groups; 
and 3) government organizations or others. Government/other affiliations are the baseline 
group in the models that follow. 
Results 
Describing the Cognitive and Behavioral Characteristics of Policy Conflict 
The summary statistics for both the cognitive and behavioral characteristics of conflict indicate 
that the policy actors in the oil and gas subsystem in Colorado fall on a spectrum of conflict. The 
distribution of scores on the three dimensions of cognitive characteristics varies widely across 
the survey sample. The average scores on the individual dimensions of cognitive characteristics 
are skewed toward the higher end of the scales, but with wide variance in responses and with 
the mean scores falling just above the mid-range of the scales. (See Appendix A, Table A1 for 
the descriptive statistics on these variables). The distribution of the composite cognitive index 
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is similar. The mean score on a scale of 1-27 is 9.48, but there is wide variance in the scores 
(s.d.= 7.17). As we have previously shown, the distribution is slightly skewed toward moderate 
to higher levels of conflict intensity, or to scores above the median, which is the multiplicative 
moderate value for the three dimensions (Heikkila & Weible, 2017). 
The behavioral characteristics show similar patterns. First, in the behavioral index, the mean 
score is 5.89 on a scale of 0-8, suggesting a positively skewed distribution. Yet there is wide 
variance again among respondents, with a standard deviation of 2.32. (See Appendix A, Table 
2). Still, a large proportion of the policy actors in this population (60%-90%) is engaged in each 
of the behavioral activities comprising the composite behavioral index. Given that the defini-
tion of policy actors includes people who are somehow actively involved in trying to shape a 
policy outcome, and thus the nature of the sampling frame, it is not surprising that a large 
proportion of actors engage in these behavioral activities.
When looking at the combined index of cognitive and behavioral conflict characteristics (cal-
culated by multiplying the unweighted cognitive score and unweighted behavioral score), we 
find some notable patterns. Figure 1 below presents a density distribution in a sunflower plot 
of both the unweighted indices together. Each of the shorter lines on the plot represents one 
respondent, a longer line represents two respondents, the point where two lines cross repre-
sents four respondents and additional lines are added to the “sunflowers” for each additional 
respondent. Not surprisingly, policy actors, who tend to score higher on the cognitive index, 
also score higher on the behavioral index. However, many policy actors show higher levels on 
the behavioral index but have lower to moderate scores on the cognitive index. This may be 
because there is a large proportion of respondents that is not affiliated with interest groups. 
Some 54% of the respondents affiliate with government or research/media/consulting. It is 
quite possible that many policy actors engage in behaviors to influence public policy but do 
not perceive or feel the same level of intensity of conflict cognitively as do other policy actors. 
Figure 1. Density-Distribution Sunflower Plot for Conflict Composite and Behavioral Com-
posite Indexes
Source: The Authors
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Exploring How Policy Actor Attributes Relate to Conflict Characteristics
The second aim of this study was to examine how policy actor attributes related to conflict 
characteristics. Previous research emphasized that rigidity of risk-benefit perceptions, insular 
networks, and affiliations with advocacy groups (industry and environmental organizations in 
this context) were associated with the individual dimensions of cognitive characteristics and 
the combined index (Heikkila & Weible, 2017). In this article, we explore these policy actor 
attributes in relation to the behavioral characteristics index, and in relation to the combined 
cognitive-behavioral index. Also, unlike this previous analysis of the cognitive characteristics, 
we examine how the behavioral characteristics help explain cognitive characteristics and vice-
versa. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of three ordered logit models using each of the three indices 
(cognitive, behavioral, and combined cognitive-behavioral) as dependent variables. The inde-
pendent variables are the intrapersonal and interpersonal actor attributes. For the cognitive 
model, we include the behavioral index as an explanatory variable and, for the behavioral mod-
el, we include the cognitive index as an explanatory variable.















































































Number of Observations 171 171 171
Likelihood Ratio Chi2 73.73 53.38 75.41
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.08 0.07
Notes: All coefficients are odd ratios from Ordered Logit Models. p<0.10*, p<0.05**, 
p<0.001***
Source: The Authors
The results for the cognitive index model are similar to previous findings (Heikkila & Weible, 
2017), except that, by adding the behavioral index to the model (which is positive and signifi-
cant), the environmental organizational affiliation variable is no longer significant. This may be 
because many of the policy actors who exhibit high scores on the behavioral index are associ-
ated with environmental organizations, which would then dampen the effect of the environ-
mental organization affiliation in relation to government/other (the baseline organizational 
affiliation) in the model. Still, the variable for oil and gas industry affiliation is significant and 
positive in the cognitive model. In other words, relative to government/other affiliations, the 
odds of policy actors perceiving cognitive conflict characteristics are higher when actors are 
affiliated with industry. More conservative political affiliations (positive on the ideology scale) 
have slightly lower odds of being higher on the cognitive conflict index, but rigid risk and 
benefit perceptions and insular networks lead to greater odds of scoring high on the cognitive 
index. 
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The results for the behavioral model present a slightly different story than do the cognitive 
characteristics. In this model, more experience with oil and gas issues is associated with higher 
odds of engaging in conflict behaviors. This supports the second hypothesis, based on the as-
sumption that these types of behaviors require resources, time, and often knowledge which 
may come with more experience. The only other policy actor attribute significantly related to 
the behavioral index is environmental affiliation. Relative to government/other affiliations, 
the odds of engaging in conflict behaviors go up with environmental organizational affiliations. 
This pattern reinforces an interpretation of the results for the behavioral and environmental 
affiliation variables discussed above in the cognitive model. In other words, in this policy con-
text, environmental organizations may be engaging more in these types of behaviors (or at 
least self-reporting that they engage more frequently). However, notably, the cognitive charac-
teristics of conflict do not affect the odds of engaging in more of the behavioral characteristics 
of conflict, which we did not expect.
For the combined conflict index, the results reflect the findings in the other two models. In 
other words, we see higher levels of experience, rigid risk-benefit perceptions, and affiliations 
with industry and environmental organizations as being significant and associated with great-
er odds of scoring high on conflict characteristics. All these findings lend support to the hy-
potheses. At the same time, we recognize that the nuanced differences between the findings for 
the behavioral and cognitive index may highlight the need for refinement and re-evaluation of 
some of the hypotheses in relation to cognitive versus behavioral characteristics. 
Conclusion
The concept of policy conflict has been conceptually and theoretically neglected in the study 
of policy and politics. This article contributes knowledge about the characteristics of policy 
conflicts with insights drawn from policy actors involved in oil and gas politics in Colorado. The 
analysis described the characteristics of policy conflict and then explained variation in these 
characteristics, in part, with intrapersonal and interpersonal attributes of policy actors. 
As prior research showed (Heikkila & Weible, 2017), policy actors lie on a spectrum in their 
cognitive characteristics of conflict. This spectrum spans policy actors who perceive high policy 
conflict and those who perceive high policy concord. For what has been an ostensibly conten-
tious issue of oil and gas development in Colorado, this reveals that perceptions of conflict are 
not ubiquitous across a population. 
Enriching the interpretations of the cognitive characteristics of conflict are the behavioral 
characteristics. The result shows that most policy actors engage in some political behavior, 
which is not unexpected given that the target population of the survey was policy actors. Addi-
tionally, policy actors, whose perception spans the spectrum of the cognitive characteristics of 
conflict, engage in various political behaviors. Those who engage in political behaviors perceive 
both low and high cognitive characteristics of conflict. 
We then find that the dual characteristics of conflict tend to be explained by experience, rigid-
ity in risk and benefit perceptions, insular networks, and different organizational affiliations, 
which corroborate the third, fourth, and fifth hypotheses. Yet the results differ between the 
cognitive and behavioral indices when modeled separately. For instance, ideology and indus-
try affiliation are significant in the cognitive model but not in the behavioral; whereas expe-
rience and environmental affiliations are significant in the behavioral model but not in the 
cognitive. Additionally, the behavioral characteristics explain some of the dimensions of the 
cognitive characteristics of conflict, but the reverse is not confirmed; in other words, the cog-
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nitive characteristics of conflict do not affect the odds of engaging in more of the behavioral 
characteristics of conflict. Again, we did not have specific hypotheses about how the cognitive 
and behavioral characteristics relate to one another, but, in this case at least, we find that be-
haviors may be more likely to drive cognitive characteristics than the reverse. In other words, 
our hypotheses – and our knowledge about policy conflicts – may need to be refined to capture 
these differences in the cognitive and behavioral characteristics. We also need to pay attention 
to whether these characteristics, and their underlying dimensions explored in this study, are of 
theoretical importance for the question and the case at hand.
These findings have several theoretical implications, which we organize under the PCF and the 
broader study of policy conflict. We phrase these implications as questions to guide future re-
search agendas on policy conflicts. First, what is the relationship between the cognitive and behav-
ioral characteristics of conflict? Many theoretical models of behavior depict thoughts preceding 
action (e.g., Stern, 2000; Ajzen, 1991; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014) and others, such as the PCF, 
are more ambiguous. However, the empirical results herein suggest that behaviors precede ac-
tion. The relationship between cognitive and behavioral characteristics could be endogenous 
with one shaping and being shaped by the other. Alternatively, the patterns discovered might 
reflect the idiosyncratic tendencies in the case study and the measurements. Then again, the 
relationship between the cognitive and the behavioral characteristics of conflict might some-
how depend on time, including how long the policy conflict has been recognized and the nature 
of its development. In older policy conflicts, compared with more nascent ones, the cognitive 
characteristics of conflict could, arguably, be more likely to be affected by past political behav-
iors. Moreover, this article is unable to unravel completely how the cognitive and the behav-
ioral characteristics of policy conflict actually interact and evolve over time, which could be 
explored in a number of ways including in-depth interviews. Thus, the data used in this article 
prevent the complete untangling of this relationship, but prompt more research in this area.
Second, what are the theoretical and methodological implications of analyzing policy conflicts as in-
dividual and collective phenomena? Policy conflicts emerge within individuals, but also in aggre-
gation at different levels of analysis, such as a policy action situation, a policy subsystem, or a 
political system (Weible & Heikkila, 2017). The experience of individuals will likely vary within 
a population on any given policy issue with some experiencing low-intensity policy conflict 
(or high policy concord) and others experiencing high-intensity policy conflict. When these 
individual measures are combined and, thus, form a distribution of conflict intensity within a 
population, the causes and effects of such distributions are unknown. Among the next steps 
is to explore policy conflicts at different levels and to compare these conflicts, both within and 
across different policy settings, to ascertain the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon. 
Third, how generalizable are findings on oil and gas conflicts in Colorado in terms of other policy 
subsystems or other policy issues? Despite the importance of conflict in policy and politics, any 
argument about the generalizability of the findings from this analysis is speculation. There has 
simply not been enough focus on policy conflicts through in-depth or comparative case studies 
to assess the generalizability of the findings. Until this happens, any capacity to interpret the 
characteristics of conflict from a larger perspective remains handicapped.
Fourth, what are the trade-offs in using different research methods to capture the characteristics of 
the policy conflict concept? The policy-conflict concept consists of two characteristics, each with 
a number of dimensions (Weible & Heikkila, 2017). The empirical data herein were collected 
from an online survey of policy actors. Such a method of data collection can be unfeasible in 
some settings and unaffordable in others. Similarly, comparative research agendas often re-
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quire the use of interviews, coding procedures, or different forms of data collection other than 
online surveys, and for some of these data sources precise measures of policy conflict become 
unrealistic. Thus, some data sources allow researchers to measure these characteristics and 
dimensions directly. For other data sources, the underlying dimensions of conflict characteris-
tics may be difficult to measure directly, resulting in an emphasis on particular aspects of the 
concept over others, or in more blunt measures. As with any data source, the trade-offs should 
be considered. For instance, less complete measures of cognitive conflict characteristics might 
be found in news-media data, but an advantage of such data would be an enhanced capacity to 
study characteristics longitudinally. Another consideration in measuring policy conflict char-
acteristics is how to model some of their underlying dimensions in ways that are theoretically 
relevant for a given context. For example, one could weigh different measures of the behavioral 
characteristics of policy conflict by their cooperative or adversarial traits. Moving forward in 
the study of policy conflict necessitates some research efforts that disaggregate the concept 
into constitutive dimensions, and other studies which may retain more aggregated measures, 
or which measure only a few of the dimensions. Among the next steps in the study of policy 
conflict is the devising of strategies for measuring and modeling the concepts with different 
data sources and recognizing the strengths and limitations of different approaches. Accepting 
the necessity of different measures of policy conflict, a shared conceptual understanding of 
such conflict becomes obligatory in binding various research efforts together.
Fifth, to what extent does policy conflict, as a concept, relate to other theoretical approaches to poli-
tics and policy? The intersection of policy conflict with other approaches in studying policy and 
politics is necessary. For example, the data collected in this article could be used to identify two 
rival coalitions, as guided by the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Heikkila and Weible, 
2016). On one side of the debate would be a pro-fracking coalition consisting of industry and 
some local and state government officials. On the other side would be an anti-fracking coali-
tion, consisting of environmental and citizens’ groups, many scientists, and some government 
officials from local, state, and federal levels. However, the identification of coalitions is not 
tantamount to claims of low, moderate, or high levels of conflict. Indeed, the evidence in this 
article suggests that not everyone perceives conflict, yet there are likely to be two coalitions 
operating in this issue area. Among the unanswered questions to explore is the relationship 
between advocacy coalitions and the intensity of the cognitive and behavioral characteristics 
of policy conflict.
Questions remain about the nature of policy conflicts. Policy conflicts are complex and the dis-
tribution of conflict characteristics across actors, and the sources of those characteristics, will 
undoubtedly vary across different policy issues and settings. The primary contribution of this 
article is not a solidified, generalizable answer to all policy conflicts, but the attention that this 
article brings to policy conflict to help build knowledge about these phenomena. The hope is to 
motivate others to analyze policy conflicts in different settings and to explore their intricacies. 
Only through a concerted effort by many scholars, over time and across issues, can we learn 
about the meaning of policy conflicts in any given setting, draw generalizable lessons and help 
to advance the knowledge about policy and politics.
Bibliography
Ajzen, I. (1991). The Theory of Planned Behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Pro-
cesses, 50(2), 179–211
261We ible  /  He i k k i la  |  C onn e ct in g  Co g ni t ive  a nd  B ehav io ra l  C ha ra cte r i s t i c s  o f  Pol i c y  Con f l i ct . . .
Baumgartner, F.R., & Jones, B.D. (1993). Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press.
Baumgartner, F.R., Berry, J.M, Hojnacki, M., Kimball, D.C, & Leach, B.L. (2009). Lobbying and Policy 
Change. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Billig, M. G., &Tajfe, H. (1973). Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup Behavior. Euro-
pean Journal of Social Psychology, 3(1), 27–52.
Cobb, R. W.,& Elder, C.D. (1972). Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda-Building. 
Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press.
Heikkila, T. & Weible, C.M. (2015). A Summary Report of a 2015 Survey of the Politics of Oil and 
Gas Development that Uses Hydraulic Fracturing in Colorado. Published July 24, 2015 by the School 
of Public Affairs University of Colorado Denver.
Heikkila, T., & Weible, C.M. (2016). Contours of Coalition Politics in the United States.” In C.M. 
Weible, T.Heikkila, K. Ingold, & M. Fischer (Eds.), Policy Debates on Hydraulic Fracturing: Comparing 
Coalition Politics in North America and Europe (pp. 29-52). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Heikkila, T., & Weible, C.M. (2017). Unpacking the Intensity of Policy Conflict: A Study of Colorado’s 
Oil and Gas Subsystem. Policy Sciences, 50(2), 179-193. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-017-9285-1
Heikkila, T., Weible, C.M, & Olofsson; K. (2017). Lessons from State-Level and National-Level Pol-
icy Conflicts over U.S. Shale Development. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Develop-
ment, 59(3), 4-13.
Hood, G. (2016). Fight over Drilling Could Spill onto November ballots. March 9, 2016. Colorado 
Public Radio. Retrieved from:  
https://www.cpr.org/2016/03/09/greeley-fight-over-drilling-could-spill-to-novembers-ballots
Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (1990). Democratic Politics and Policy Analysis. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Jenkins-Smith, H., Nohrstedt, D., & Sabatier, P.A. (2014). The Advocacy Coalition Framework: 
Foundations, Evolution, and Ongoing Research. In P.A. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the Policy Process. 
(3rd ed., pp. 183-224). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Kahan, D.M. (2012). Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection: An experimental 
study. Judgment and Decision Making, 8, 407-424.
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (2013). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, Econo-
metrica, 47(2), 263-291.
Lasswell, H.D. (1971). A Preview of Policy Sciences. New York, NY: American Elsevier Publishing Com-
pany. 
Ostrom, E. (2009). Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Pralle, S.B. (2006). Branching out Digging in. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Schattschneider, E. E. (1957). Intensity, visibility, direction and scope. The American Political Science 
Review, 51(4), 933-942.
Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America 
(Illinois.Stern, P.C. (2000). Towards a Coherent Theory of Environmentally Significant Behavior. 
Journal of Social Issues, 56(3), 407-424.
Susskind, L., McKearnan, S., & Thomas-Larmer; J. (Eds.) (1999). The Consensus Building Handbook: A 
Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
262 In te r n a t ion a l  R e v ie w o f  P ubl i c  Pol i c y,  2 :3
Tajfel, H., Billig, M.G., Bundy, R.P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social Categorization and Intergroup Be-
havior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1(2), 149-78.
Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2007). Contentious Politics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2014a). Colorado State Profile and Energy Analysis. U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, Washington, DC. Retrieved from: 
http://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.cfm?sid=CO
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2014b). Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production. U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, Washington, DC. Retrieved from: 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dcu_NUS_m.htm
Weible, C.M. (2008). Expert-Based Information and Policy Subsystems: A Review and Synthesis. 
Policy Studies Journal, 36(4), 615-635. 
Weible, C.M. & Heikkila, T. (2016). Comparing the Politics of Hydraulic Fracturing in New York, 
Colorado, and Texas. Review of Policy Research, 33(3), 232-250.
Weible, C.M. & Heikkila, T. (2017). Policy Conflict Framework. Policy Sciences, 50(1), 23-40.
Appendix





Mobilizing the Public 115 (61 %) 74 (39 %)
Providing Information to Government 157 (83.5 %) 31 (16.5 %)
Providing Information to Media 131 (70 %) 57 (30 %)
Sharing Opinion with Government 156 (82.5 %) 33 (17.5 %)
Brokering Agreements 119 (63 %) 69 (37 %)
Countering Arguments of People You Disagree 
With
168 (90 %) 19 (10 %)
Collaborating with Opponents 144 (77 %) 42 (23 %
Coordinating with Allies 112 (60 %) 76 (40 %)
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Table A2. Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables
Dependent Variables Valid 
Cases
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation
Divergent Policy Position 196 .04 2.04 .96 .75
Perceived Threats 205 2.00 10.00 6.83 2.25
Unwilling to Compromise 188 1.40 5.00 3.29 .81
Cognitive Composite Index 186 1.00 27.00 9.48 7.17
Behavioral Index 183 0.00 8.00 5.89 2.32
Combined Cognitive-Behavioral 
Index
176 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.24
Scaled Explanatory Variables Valid 
Cases
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation
Political View (-2=extremely 
liberal; +2= extremely 
conservative)
186 -2 2 -.25 .83
Diversity of Experience 190 8.00 32.00 20.62 4.66
Level of Education 189 2.00 6.00 4.93 .93
Perceived Risks Relative to 
Benefits
213 -4.00 4.00 -.31 2.10
Rigidity of Risks and 
Benefits
207 -1.00 1.00 .55 .52
Insular Networks 192 0.00 8.00 2.20 2.01
Dummy Explanatory Variables Valid 
Cases
N  %
Industry Affiliation 236 64 27
Env. or Citizen Group 
Affiliation
236 44 18
Government or Other Affiliation 236 128 54
